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ROGER THAT: CALLING AN AUDIBLE ON THE NFL COMMISSIONER'S FINAL
AUTHORITY OVER PLAYER DISCIPLINARY MATTERS AS THE 2020 CBA RENEGOTIATION LOOMS
By
Kyle Yager
I.

INTRODUCTION

The National Football League (the “NFL”) is the most popular and most valuable
sports league in the United States.1 In 2018, the NFL accounted for 46 of the top 50 mostwatched shows on television,2 including NBC’s “Sunday Night Football” which continued
its streak as the number one primetime show for the eighth consecutive year.3 Additionally,
the NFL generates the most revenue of any professional sports league, holds the most
valuable franchises,4 and attracts the highest per game attendance numbers.5
As an employer, discipline is of paramount important to the NFL.6 Without an
effective discipline policy in place, employers subject themselves to major risks.7 Every
NFL team employs somewhere between 43 and 53 players throughout each season, which
results in up to 1,696 players employed by the league in a given year.8 Accordingly, up to
1,696 NFL employees are subject to the NFL’s player discipline policy on a yearly basis.
In the 2019 season, 62 players were suspended.9 This has been an upward trend in
the league since the last collective bargaining agreement (the “CBA”) was signed in 2011.10
 Kyle Yager is a J.D. candidate at Penn State Law, class of 2021, and an associate editor of the Penn State
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1. Frank Pallotta, NFL ratings rebound after two seasons of declining viewership, CNN (Jan. 3, 2019, 4:52
PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/03/media/nfl-ratings-2018-season/index.html.
2. Id.
3. TV News Desk, RATINGS: NBC Sees Most-Watched SUNDAY NIGHT FOOTBALL Game Ever,
Broadway World (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.broadwayworld.com/bwwtv/article/RATINGS-NBC-SeesMost-Watched-SUNDAY-NIGHT-FOOTBALL-Game-Ever-20190930.
4. Christina Gough, National Football League (NFL) – Statistics & Facts, Statista (Oct. 18, 2018),
https://www.statista.com/topics/963/national-football-league/.
5. Id.
6. See Employee Discipline, 16 ANDREWS EMP. LITIG. REP., no. 6, 2001, at 12.
7. See id.
8.
See
NFL
Collective
Bargaining
Agreement
(Aug.
2011), https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf.

4,

9. NFL Fines & Suspensions, Spotrac, https://www.spotrac.com/nfl/fines-suspensions/2019/suspensions/
(last visited July 27, 2020).
10. See NFL Fines & Suspensions, supra note 9.
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The NFL has suspended 468 players for various infractions in the last eight years.11 By
comparison, between 2002 and 2011, the NFL suspended a total of 82 players.12 This
means that the most recent CBA, and the subsequent Personal Conduct Policy (the “PCP”)
that slightly modified the CBA, has resulted in over five times the amount of player
suspensions as the previous agreement. This disparity is highlighted by multiple highly
publicized, high-profile player cases involving players like Adrian Peterson,13 Ezekiel
Elliot,14 and Tom Brady.15
The purpose of this article is to advocate for a change to the NFL’s player
disciplinary appeals process. Specifically, this process needs to be changed from the
current system, where the Commissioner is authorized to assume the role as the sole and
final arbitrator, to a neutral arbitration process. This article will begin by giving a brief
overview of the CBA in part two. Part three will explain the Commissioner’s powers
currently granted by the league. Next, part four will dive into the issues that have stemmed
from the Commissioner’s granted powers. Part five will then explain the arbitration process
for player discipline that the National Hockey League employs and why it is superior to
the NFL’s policy. Lastly, part six will provide and explain a potential solution to the
Commissioner’s current disciplinary authority based on the NHL’s process.
II.

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CBA

Notwithstanding the sharp increase in players facing discipline over the past
decade, the Commissioner’s exclusive disciplinary powers have existed since the first CBA
in 1968.16 The NFL Management Council (the “NFLMC”), which represents clubs and
their owners, and the NFL Players’ Association (the “NFLPA”), which represents the
players, collectively negotiate the NFL’s CBA.17 The CBA is essentially a labor agreement
between both parties, with each side attempting to balance conceding rights and privileges
in certain areas in order to receive support from the other side in areas they view as more
important.18 This negotiation process includes attempting to reach an agreement on
elements such as player safety, salary, revenue sharing, worker’s compensation and player
discipline.19 Linchpins of the 2011 CBA included agreeing to new terms on revenue
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985 (8th Cir. 2016).
14. NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 296 F. Supp. 3d 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
15. NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016).
16. Mike Florio, Commissioner’s power under Article 46 has been present since the first CBA, NBC Sports
(May 17, 2015, 7:18 PM), https://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2015/05/17/commissioners-power-underarticle-46-has-been-present-since-the-first-cba/.
17. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8.
18. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8.
19. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8.
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sharing, rookie wage scales, and the salary cap, among other things.20 Notably, however,
player discipline – and the commissioner’s power to discipline – were not a focus.21
III.

THE COMMISSIONER’S POWERS

The Commissioner’s role in resolving disputes is initially articulated within the
NFL’s Constitution & Bylaws.22 Here, the Commissioner is granted “full, complete and
final jurisdiction and authority to arbitrate” player discipline.23
Additionally, the Commissioner’s disciplinary powers are detailed in Article 46 of
the CBA.24 The Commissioner is granted exclusive authority to essentially act as judge,
jury, and executioner when handling player discipline.25 Specifically, the Commissioner is
authorized to initially impose actions against players for “conduct detrimental to the
integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football.”26 Players are able
to subsequently challenge these actions by appealing them through the NFLPA.27 However,
as articulated by the CBA, and reaffirmed by the PCP,28 their challenges return to the
Commissioner’s desk, as he is authorized to act as the sole arbiter in handling these
appeals.29 The Commissioner is then directed to appoint one or more hearings officers to
hear the appeal, but the Commissioner himself is authorized to serve as hearing officer in
any appeal dealing with “conduct detrimental,” at his discretion.30 Thus, the final decision
for this type of player discipline is subject to the absolute power of the Commissioner.

20. Patrick Rishe, Who Won The 2011 Lockout?, Forbes (July 11, 2011, 10:44 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/07/21/who-won-the-2011-nfl-lockout/#24f0992e7071.
21. See id.
22. NFL, Constitution and Bylaws of the National Football
(2006), https://onlabor.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/co_.pdf.

League,

art.

VII,

§

8.6

23. Id.
24. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8.
25. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8.
26. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8.
27. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8.
28.
See
NFL,
Personal
Conduct
Policy
https://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/photo/2017/08/11/0ap3000000828506.pdf.
29. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8.
30. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8.

241

(2016),

When it went into effect, the aforementioned PCP slightly altered the scope of the
Commissioner’s disciplinary authority articulated in the CBA.31 The new version was
announced in 2014,32 and it was revised in 2016.33 Notably, the PCP provides that “[a]
disciplinary officer will . . . investigate a potential violation . . . . The Commissioner will
review the report and determine the appropriate discipline . . . . Appeals of any disciplinary
decision will be processed pursuant to Article 46 of the CBA.”34 This new policy was,
among other things, a result of the NFL’s botched handling of multiple player disciplinary
matters near the end of the 2014 season.35 Because the new PCP removed the
Commissioner’s role as sole arbitrator from the initial conduct hearing regarding
disciplinary matters, it restricts his disciplinary authority to a certain extent.36 Instead,
discipline is now investigated by a Special Counsel for Investigations and Conduct, as
appointed by the NFL.37 However, the decision made by this appointed disciplinary officer
remains under the delegated authority of the Commissioner.38 Further, notwithstanding this
change to the Commissioner’s initial disciplinary powers, the PCP ultimately reaffirms the
Commissioner’s powers to make the final decision on disciplinary matters.39 The
Commissioner still retains his appellate powers when the league is faced with a player
disciplinary matter.40
In the events leading up to the NFL’s most recent PCP, the NFLPA advocated for
a neutral, third-party arbitrator to have final say on player discipline.41 NFL representatives
31. Karisa Maxwell, A Beginner’s Guide to Understanding the NFL Personal Conduct Policy, Vice (Dec. 8,
2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qkg9q5/a-beginners-guide-to-understanding-the-nflpersonal-conduct-policy.
32. Id.
33. Daniel Gallen, Lesean McCoy: What NFL personal conduct policy could mean for Harrisburgh native
after
domestic
abuse
allegations,
Penn
Live
(July
10,
2018),
https://www.pennlive.com/news/2018/07/lesean_mccoy_nfl_personal_cond.html.
34.
See
NFL,
The
New
Personal
Conduct
Policy,
http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/photo/2014/12/10/0ap3000000441677.pdf (last visited Oct. 20,
2019).
35. Maxwell, supra note 31.
36. See Jeff Gray & Louis Bien, NFL approves new personal conduct policy, SB Nation (Dec. 20, 2014, 1:17
PM),
https://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2014/12/10/7355439/nfl-personal-conduct-policy-roger-goodellowners-meetings.
37. See id.
38. See NFL, supra note 34.
39. See NFL, supra note 34.
40. See NFL, supra note 34.
41. Jenny Vrentas, Three Months After Ray Rice…, Sports Illustrated (Dec. 10, 2014),
https://www.si.com/2014/12/10/nfl-new-personal-conduct-policy-explained.

242

disagreed.42 For example, one NFL owner stated that, at that point in time, every owner
was in agreement that the Commissioner should have final authority over player
discipline.43 Despite their outcry, and their contention that the new policy should be
collectively bargained,44 the NFLPA was ultimately uninvolved in the enactment of the
new PCP.45
ISSUES WITH THE COMMISSIONER’S AUTHORITY

IV.

Major issues stemming from the NFL Commissioner’s disciplinary authority have
been highlighted over the past several years.46 These issues have tarnished the NFL’s
reputation.47 Every party subject to the CBA would be better served with not only a change,
but a complete overhaul of the Commissioner’s appellate power over player discipline. As
stated in the 2011 CBA, the very purpose for the Commissioner’s authority is to eliminate
“conduct detrimental to the integrity, or public confidence, in the game.”48 Ironically, the
absolute power he wields in making the final ruling on these actions has been, in itself,
detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the NFL.49
A. THE IMPACT OF THE COMMISSIONER’S AUTHORITY ON PLAYERS
The players would benefit from a new player disciplinary process because they
truly per se suffer from the Commissioner’s role in wielding the proverbial player
discipline gavel.50 The publicity surrounding player misconduct and the resulting

42. Id.
43. See id.
44. Id.
45. See Michael O’Keefe, NFL players union files grievance vs. NFL over new personal conduct policy,
Daily News (Jan. 23, 2015, 11:14 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/nflpa-files-grievancenfl-new-conduct-policy-article-1.2089402.
46. See Tara Sullivan, NFL’s system of justice an inconsistent mess, Boston Globe (July 23, 2019, 11:48
PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/patriots/2019/07/23/nfl-system-justice-inconsistentmess/afP4zKBgEyOH1bvL0OIh4J/story.html (stating that little has changed over the years regarding
player disciplinary matters in the “the NFL’s inability to deal with these incidents with any hint of
consistency, any shred of credibility, or even one iota of accountability”).
47. See Jon Helmkamp, NFL has huge hypocrisy problem with Seahawks Jarran Reed suspension,
Fansided, https://12thmanrising.com/2020/05/06/seattle-seahawks-fans-need-stronger-together-t-shirt/ (last
visited May 25, 2020).
48. See 2011 NFL CBA, supra note 8.
49. See Helmkamp, supra note 47.
50. Steve Stradley, What is Sensible Discipline for NFL Player Misconduct, Stradley Law Firm (Sept. 16,
2014), https://www.stradleylaw.com/blog/sensible-discipline-nfl-player-misconduct/.
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suspensions has negatively impacted players reputationally and in their playing time.51
This, in turn, has hit players where it hurts: their wallets.52 NFL players need a more equal
way to determine their disciplinary punishment because they are the ones who are directly
impacted by the flawed process.53 Further, players need more consistency so they can have
a better idea of what to expect from the beginning and act accordingly. The negative impact
of the current system is illustrated by player disciplinary actions and subsequent player
cases against the NFL, which will be discussed now.
1. TOM BRADY
A judicial assessment of the absolute power of the Commissioner arose in the
“Deflategate” controversy involving New England Patriots’ quarterback Tom Brady.54 In
this case, Brady was accused and later suspended for four games for his alleged
involvement in a scheme to deflate footballs during the 2014 National Football Conference
Championship game.55 Following the suspension announcement, Brady sought
arbitration.56 NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell, serving as league arbitrator, entered an
award confirming the discipline.57 The NFLPA, on behalf of Brady, sought judicial review,
and the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York vacated the award.58 The
NFL subsequently appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.59 The court reversed
the vacatur after noting the substantial deference courts are required to allow the arbitrator
in labor agreements.60 The court relied on the “conduct detrimental” language from Article
46 of the CBA in determining that Goodell properly exercised his broad discretion as
arbitrator in resolving an intramural controversy between the NFL and a player.61 The court
explained that “[i]t is the arbitrator's construction of the contract and assessment of the
facts that are dispositive, however good, bad, or ugly.”62 Further, the court determined that
“[i]f the arbitrator acts within the scope of this authority, the remedy for a dissatisfied party
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016).
55. Id. at 531.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. NFL Mgmt. Council, 820 F.3d at 531.
60. Id. at 532.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 536.
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is not judicial intervention, but for the parties to draft their agreement to reflect the scope
of power they would like their arbitrator to exercise.”63 Thus, the court determined that in
order for the players to combat the ability of the Commissioner to act as final arbiter over
disciplinary matters, they would have to agree to a new process with the NFLMC in the
next CBA.
2. ADRIAN PETERSON
In 2014, Goodell suspended Minnesota Vikings running back Adrian Peterson
indefinitely for “conduct detrimental . . . to the game.”64 Peterson’s suspension was
Goodell’s response to the state of Minnesota’s charges of misdemeanor reckless assault
against Peterson.65 Peterson was charged with reckless assault based on an incident with
one of his children.66 In addition to the suspension, Goodell fined Peterson.67
The suspension was ultimately vacated by the district court of Minnesota after
Peterson challenged it.68 Consequently, the NFL appealed, arguing that the fine should
stand.69 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the parties were bound
by the arbitrator’s decision.70 The court explained that “Article 46 and the Personal
Conduct Policy by their terms place no limit on the Commissioner’s authority to suspend
players.”71 The court further articulated that “[a]llowing the Commissioner or the
Commissioner's designee to hear challenges to the Commissioner's initial decisions may
present an actual or apparent conflict of interest for the arbitrator. But the parties bargained
for this procedure, and the Association consented to it.”72 Thus, the Eighth Circuit also
seemed to indicate that the only way to combat the Commissioner’s broad authority over
player disciplinary matters is for the parties to agree to new terms in the next CBA.
3. EZEKIEL ELLIOT

63. Id. at 537.
64. NFL Players Ass’n v. NFL, 831 F.3d 985, 989 (8th Cir. 2016).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. NFL Players Ass’n, 831 F.3d at 989.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 995.
72. Id. at 998.
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In 2017, Goodell suspended Dallas Cowboys running back Ezekiel Elliot for six
games. The suspension came after a league-sponsored investigation into domestic
violence allegations against Elliot.74 The NFLPA subsequently filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction to block enforcement of the six-game suspension.75 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York ultimately denied the motion.76
In its analysis, the court emphasized the "narrowly circumscribed and highly deferential
function that courts play” when tasked with reviewing arbitration awards.77 Further, the
court aligned its reasoning with the Brady court in the other NFL Mgmt. Council case by
explaining both the broad authority of the arbitrator and the judicial restriction on
interpreting an arbitrator’s authority articulated in a labor agreement.78 Thus, the court
affirmed Goodell’s ability to enforce his own impositions.79
73

4. TYREEK HILL
In one of the most recent cases implicating the Commissioner’s disciplinary role,
Kansas City Chiefs wide receiver Tyreek Hill faced allegations for alleged battery against
a juvenile.80 Hill did not face formal charges, but the NFL investigated him for allegedly
breaking his son’s arm.81 Not long after the allegations rose, Hill was heard in an audio clip
taken before the incident where he discussed potential child abuse.82 Hill has a history of
domestic issues, which likely played a role in the Chiefs suspending Hill indefinitely.83 The
NFL proceeded to conduct a four month investigation into the matter. 84 At the conclusion

73. NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 296 F. Supp. 3d 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 627.
77. Id. at 621.
78. See NFL Mgmt. Council, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 622–623; see also NFL Mgmt. Council, v. NFL Players
Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527, 537 (2d Cir. 20160).
79. See NFL Mgmt. Council, 296 F. Supp. 3d at 624.
80. Emily Caron, Timeline of Events that Led to No Suspension for Tyreek Hill from the NFL, Sports
Illustrated (July 19, 2019), https://www.si.com/nfl/2019/07/19/chiefs-tyreek-hill-domestic-assault-childabuse-timeline-no-suspension-decision.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (In 2015, Hill plead guilty to charges of domestic assault and battery for punching and choking his
partner Crystal Espinal. Espinal was eight weeks pregnant at the time.)
84. Id.
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of the investigation, Goodell and the NFL announced that Hill would not be punished.85
Accordingly, Hill was then eligible to play.86
5. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES FOR PLAYERS
The NFL’s conclusion in the Tyreek Hill situation showcases the inconsistencies
that stem from its current disciplinary policy. Other than Goodell’s final decision, Tyreek
Hill’s case and Ezekiel Elliot’s case have a lot of similarities.87 Both cases lacked criminal
charges.88 Both players raised doubts about the accusations against them.89 Both players
maintained their innocence along with doubts about the truthfulness of the other parties
involved.90 However, only Elliot was punished.91
Hill was able to escape punishment where a number of other players have not. For
example, Seattle Seahawks player Jarran Reed was suspended for six games as a result of
domestic issue with less details available than in Hill’s incident.92 Baltimore Ravens player
Jimmy Smith was suspended for “threatening and emotionally abusive behaviors” towards
his girlfriend.93 A major difference, however, is that in Smith’s case, there were no
allegations of physical abuse.94 Further, Hill was not punished for domestic allegations,
while Brady was punished for allegations of deflating footballs.95 Brady even denied the
allegations under oath.96 Although this was not a domestic issue, it was still an off-field
disciplinary matter that fell within the Commissioner’s articulated powers.97 These
suspensions, and many more, were handed out while Hill, a player with a history of
domestic problems and a damning audio recording, escaped punishment.98 Unfortunately,
85. Caron, supra note 80.
86. See id.
87. Sullivan, supra note 46.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Sullivan, supra note 46.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Sullivan, supra note 46.
98. Id.
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Hill is not the only player who faced heavily incriminating circumstances, yet escaped
punishment.99 Accordingly, this comparative analysis is a testament to the dangerous
inconsistencies of the NFL’s disciplinary policy and Goodell’s arbitrary judgment in his
role as the sole final arbiter. These inconsistencies are concerning because they appear to
showcase that Goodell’s objective is not necessarily justice for off-field transgressions, and
that there may be other less righteous factors at play in his decision making.
B. THE VALUE OF A NEW PROCESS FOR OWNERS
The Owners would also benefit from a new process for player discipline in the new
CBA. Under the current process, Goodell has hurt the reputation of the NFL with both his
lack of review or discipline in certain situations and his overall inconsistent, erratic
approach to player discipline.100 Consistency in practice and procedure is important to
ensure the integrity of the disciplinary process and to avoid claims of unfairness.101
The lack of consistency results in both players and fans losing faith in the NFL.
Additionally, player suspensions have hurt TV ratings.102 The NFL at its core is a business,
and less viewership hurts its bottom line.103
Notably, some owners have specifically indicated that they are considering
revisiting the NFL’s process for handling criminal allegations of players.104 Dallas
Cowboys owner Jerry Jones said, “[W]e all know that we’ve had problematic aspects to
our discipline, our investigations. We all know that those have been there.”105 Jones also
previously stated that he believed the NFL needed to reevaluate its disciplinary
procedures.106 Accordingly, it is likely in the best interest of owners to revise the player
disciplinary process so public perception may improve and the League can maintain a more
consistent approach.
99. See Rachel Axon, Ray Rice case prompted NFL changes on domestic violence, but cases continue to test
policy,
USA
Today
(Sept.
18,
2019,
9:54
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2019/09/18/nfl-domestic-violence-ray-rice-tyreekhill-ezekiel-elliott-adrian-peterson/2215187001/.
100. See Sullivan, supra note 46.
101. See Wayne D. Garris & Christina Zebrowski, XpertHR Employment Law Manual 2256 (2019).
102. See Erik Pedersen, Will Tom Brady’s Suspension Let The Air Out Of NBC’s NFL Opener?, Deadline
(May 11, 2015 3:15 PM), https://deadline.com/2015/05/tom-brady-suspened-nfl-opener-steelers-nbc1201424809/ (discussing the impact of Tom Brady’s four game suspension to NBC ratings).
103. See David Lantham, Fire Goodell #3: Jarran Reed Hypocrisy, Last Word On Pro Football (July 22,
2019, https://lastwordonprofootball.com/2019/07/22/fire-goodell-jarran-reed-hypocrisy/.
104. Mark Maske, Some NFL owners want to revisit how the league conducts investigations, The Washington
Post (Dec. 7, 2018, 5:49 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2018/12/07/some-nfl-owners-wantrevisit-how-league-conducts-investigations/.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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C. THE COMMISSIONER
The Commissioner would benefit from losing his power to hear appeals in player
disciplinary actions as well.107 As the Commissioner of the NFL, Goodell is both the face
of the league and the scapegoat for problems and public criticism.108 His broad
responsibilities include negotiating deals to bring revenue into the NFL, negotiating the
collective bargaining deal with the players, player discipline, scheduling, and the rules of
the game.109 If the authority to hear and rule on player discipline is removed from Goodell
and placed in the hands of a third-party, Goodell would have more time to focus on his
other responsibilities.
Further, public perception is that Goodell has not performed well in his role as final
arbitrator over player discipline.110 Consequently, Goodell would not have to face the
media and public outcry from every player disciplinary decision that receives backlash if
he is removed from this role. Goodell serves as a three way buffer of sorts between the
owners, the players, and the general public because he is the Commissioner.111
Consequently, Goodell has to juggle each group’s varying interests when handling player
disciplinary matters and imposing suspensions in order to determine the best overall
decision for the NFL.112 Generally, there are owners on both sides of the issues, and
Goodell must attempt to appease everyone.113 He has received major and mounting
criticism over the years in this role.114 Accordingly, both the perception of the

107. See Marty Keane, Should We Say Goodbye to Goodell?, The Herald (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://hhsherald.com/6313/sports/should-we-say-goodbye-to-goodell/.
108. See Roger Goodell, Vanity Fair, https://www.vanityfair.com/people/roger-goodell (last visited May
25, 2020).
109. See Jeffrey Dorfman, The NFL Commissioner Should Be Paid Far, Far Less, Forbes (Nov. 19, 2017,
2:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2017/11/19/the-nfl-commissioner-should-be-paidfar-far-less-and-im-available-cheap/#6d05a6f33e6d.
110. See George Stockburger, Roger Goodell Has Failed in His Duties as the NFL Commissioner, Fansided,
https://nflmocks.com/2016/05/30/roger-goodell-has-failed-in-his-duties-as-the-nfl-commissioner/
(last
visited Oct. 20, 2019).
111. See Mark Leibovich, Roger Goodell’s Unstoppable Football Machine, The New York Times (Feb. 3,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/magazine/roger-goodells-unstoppable-football-machine.html.
112. See id.
113. See David Haugh, Commissioner deserves blame for NFL farce, Chicago Tribune (Sept. 26, 2012),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/bears/ct-xpm-2012-09-26-ct-spt-0927-haugh-bears-chicago20120927-story.html.
114. Adam Stites, Roger Goodell’s history of favoritism, ambition and mooning, SB Nation (Jan. 26, 2015,
12:33 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2015/1/26/7909353/roger-goodells-nfl-commissioner-favoritismrobert-kraft.
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Commissioner and the NFL’s reputation as a whole would likely benefit from the removal
of his appellate powers over the player disciplinary process.115
OF MISSOURI DETERMINED THAT THE COMMISSIONER’S
POWERS RELATING TO PLAYER DISCIPLINE, AS ARTICULATED BY THE CBA, ARE
UNCONSCIONABLE

D. THE SUPREME COURT

Lastly, although not binding on the League, a state supreme court found that the
Commissioner’s authority on player disciplinary matters made the CBA unenforceable.116
In Hewitt v. Kerr, 461 S.W.3d 798, 803 (Mo. 2015), the Supreme Court of Missouri
concluded that the Commissioner’s player disciplinary powers, as articulated by the CBA,
are unconscionable.117 Todd Hewitt, a former employee of the St. Louis Rams, was able to
successfully challenge the validity of the Commissioner’s absolute power.118 In this case,
Hewitt sought a writ of mandamus requiring the St. Louis County circuit court to vacate
its order compelling arbitration of his claim of age discrimination against the St. Louis
Rams Partnership and three of its affiliates.119 In its holding, the Court determined that “the
terms in the contract designating the [C]ommissioner, an employee of the team owners, as
the sole arbitrator with unfettered discretion to establish the rules for arbitration are
unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable.”120 Further, the court explained that “due to
the lack of any terms in the employment contract or in any document incorporated into the
contract, the contract appoints the commissioner as not only the arbitrator but as the person
who controls virtually every aspect of the arbitration from establishing the rules and
procedures to making the final decision.”121 Consequently, the court disagreed with the
contract’s authorization for the Commissioner to subjectively determine punishment as he
sees fit.122 The Court determined that Goodell’s powers, as articulated by the CBA, are not
enforceable.123
115. Justin Block, Everyone Should Celebrate Stripping Roger Goodell Of Disciplinary Power, HuffPost
(March 15, 2016, 1:42 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/roger-goodell-disciplinary-powernflpa_n_56e826b3e4b0860f99da5da2?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmN
vbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAKMyQZ58HcvAeV9gZyJ5w5PeLizdtWTRKKUi02lPm6rrygsVoXtn3X
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Despite the fact that because this case is a state law case it is not binding on the
NFL, the court’s determination is notable in explaining why the position of the
Commissioner should be stripped of its appellate authority for disciplinary matters. For the
reasons set out above, this authority is detrimental for all parties involved and bound by
the CBA. While not binding, the fact that a court has found the Commissioner’s authority
to be unconscionable is a small step towards reduction of the Commissioner’s powers.
V.

THE NHL PLAYER DISCIPLINE PROCEDURE DEMONSTRATES
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE NFL’S PROCEDURE

A SUPERIOR,

In contrast to the NFL, the National Hockey League (the “NHL”) has a somewhat
different procedure in handling player discipline.124 In the NHL’s CBA, the Commissioner
or his designee is authorized to impose discipline for off-ice conduct.125 The NHLPA can
subsequently appeal the discipline on behalf of the player to an impartial arbitrator.126 The
impartial arbitrator is jointly appointed by the parties to serve for the duration of the
agreement.127 Either party may discharge the impartial arbitrator by serving written notice
upon the arbitrator and the other party by September 1st of each year.128 The parties are
then required to agree upon a successor within 90 days.129 However, if the parties are
unable to agree in that timeframe then an ad hoc arbitrator is selected under the Labor
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association.130 He or she will preside until
the parties are able to agree on a successor.131 Also, the impartial arbitrator is required to
be selected from the National Academy of Arbitrators.132
Notwithstanding its relative size and popularity in comparison to the NFL, the
NHL’s player disciplinary process for off-ice conduct is superior.133 The use of an impartial
arbitrator for appeals is pivotal in ensuring fairness to both sides throughout the
proceeding.134 When reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, the arbitrator decides
124. See NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement (Sept. 16, 2012), https://www.nhlpa.com/the-pa/cba.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See d.
128. See id.
129. See 2012 NHL CBA, supra note 124.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See Laurel Stout, The NHL Reigns King for Disciplinary Procedures, VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY (2017),
https://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/law/academics/sportslaw/commentary/sls_blog/2017/1105.html (last
visited Dec. 21, 2019).
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whether the decision was supported by sufficient evidence and whether it was reasonable
based on the facts and circumstances surrounding the conduct at issue, the proportionality
of the offense and punishment, and the interests of the league and the player.135 This, in
part, is why the NHL has a more just player disciplinary procedure than the NFL.136
VI.

PROPOSED SOLUTION

When the NFL and NFLPA meet to discuss their new CBA, the NFLPA is likely
to propose a change to the commissioner’s disciplinary powers.137 Although they are
unlikely to be able to get the NFLMC to agree to abolishing the PCP, there is a likelihood
that they will be able to agree on amending the hearing process.138 The parties should strip
the Commissioner of any power over the player discipline appeals process. Instead, the
parties should institute an impartial arbitrator similar to the NHL’s process to ensure
neutrality in final decisions.
A comment from the VALPARAISO LAW REVIEw suggested that the Commissioner,
the NFLPA, and the NFLMC should all separately choose an arbitrator from the American
Arbitration Association Labor Arbitration Rules to serve on the independent arbitration
panel.139 It is important to note that the comment was written in 2010, prior to the current
CBA and PCP. Notwithstanding its age, the crux of the comment is still extremely relevant.
The League needs to move towards an independent arbitration panel to represent player
appeals.140 However, there are potential problems that may arise from allowing each the
Commissioner and NFLMC to each select an arbitrator. If each of these parties is allowed
a separate selection, there is likely inherent bias that will tip the scales of a three-person
panel because the Commissioner is employed by the team owners,141 while the NFLMC
specifically represents the owners.142 Consequently, this proposal would likely create a
scenario where the owners have two representative parties selecting an “independent”
arbitrator, while the NFLPA is allowed only one. Thus, there is potential for this proposed
135. See 2012 NHL CBA, supra note 124.
136. See Stout, supra note 133.
137. Dan Graziano, 2021 NFL CBA negotiations: The nine biggest looming issues, ESPN (July, 3, 2019),
https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/27103713/2021-nfl-cba-negotiations-nine-biggest-looming-issues.
138. Id.
139. Joshua A. Reese, NOTE: THROWING THE RED FLAG ON THE COMMISSIONER: HOW
INDEPENDENT ARBITRATORS CAN FIT INTO THE NFL'S OFF-FIELD DISCIPLINE PROCEDURES
UNDER THE NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, 45 VAL. U.L. REV. 359 (2010).
140. See id.
141. See NFL owners elect Goodell as new commissioner, ESPN (Aug. 8, 2006),
https://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=2543783.
142. Dickey v. NFL, No. 17-cv-12295-IT, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164934 (D. Mass. Sept. 16, 2018) (stating
that “[o]wners of individual NFL clubs negotiate collectively with the NFLPA through the NFLMC, a
professional management group that serves as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of NFL club
owners.”).
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new system of an independent arbitration panel to fail to serve the very purpose of its
implementation in the new CBA.
Accordingly, in the new CBA, the NFL should essentially adopt the NHL’s
procedure for handling player discipline appeals. The parties should authorize an
independent arbitrator to hear appeals. This arbitrator should be agreed upon by both the
NFLPA and the NFLMC, and each party should be eligible to discharge the arbitrator by
providing notice both to the arbitrator and the other side by a specific date each year. The
impartial arbitrator should be selected from an official list of arbitrators agreed upon by
both sides, whether the list includes members of the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), the National Academy of Arbitrators, or another similar arbitration agency.
Further, in the event the parties are unable to agree, an ad hoc arbitrator should be selected
under the Labor Arbitration Rules of the AAA. This proposal will ensure fairness and more
balance when faced with player discipline.
The NFLPA has proposed a similar solution to the aforementioned proposal.143
They have advocated for a panel of three neutral arbitrators who are lawyers with a football
background.144 However, the NFL and NFLPA would ultimately benefit from meeting in
the middle in implementing the aforesaid proposal as part of the new player discipline
process for the new CBA. This proposal allows each party to have some influence over the
process, while ultimately leaving the decision to a neutral, third-party.
VII.

CONCLUSION

With the expiration of the current CBA on the horizon, both the NFLMC and the
NFLPA are evaluating areas of the CBA that they view as unfavorable. Accordingly, the
NFL should retain its initial process for hearing player disciplinary matters. However, the
Commissioner’s final authority over decisions regarding player discipline is an area that
the NFLPA will likely strongly advocate to change. Notwithstanding the NFLPA’s
problems with the Commissioner’s current articulated authority on these matters, removing
these powers would also be beneficial to the NFL and the Commissioner himself.
Accordingly, the NFL and NFLPA should agree to authorize an independent arbitrator to
hear player discipline appeals.
In implementing the aforementioned proposal, both sides would be able to ensure
an equal process in coming to a neutral final decision. Changing to a neutral presiding
arbitrator will have the desired effect of reaching an impartial decision where the players
will feel more comfortable with the decision. Further, the NFLMC will not be represented
by a party that seems inherently biased, and the Commissioner will have more time to focus
on other important issues. As a result, the league as a whole would benefit from removing
the Commissioners appellate powers over player discipline and enacting this neutral
arbitration process.

143. Scott Polacek, NFL, NFLPA Working Toward Stripping Roger Goodell of Discipline Authority,
Bleacher Report, https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2624791-nfl-nflpa-working-toward-stripping-rogergoodell-of-discipline-authority (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
144. Id.

253

